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INTRODUCTION
What does it take to satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard when alleging actual malice in an action for defamation?1 The answer to this question,
which has so far attracted little scholarly attention,2 not only has significant implications for public-figure defamation actions, but it also illustrates a larger
problem with the Twiqbal pleading standard.3 The Twiqbal pleading standard
* College of Law Distinguished Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. The
author would like to thank Dwight Aarons, Michael H. Hoffheimer, and Sibyl Marshall for
their invaluable contributions to earlier drafts of this article and Jack Smith, UT Law class of
2018, for outstanding research assistance.
1
This standard, also called the “plausibility” standard, was established in two U.S. Supreme
Court cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
2
To date, the only published law review article to focus on this issue appears to be Clay
Calvert et al., Plausible Pleading & Media Defendant Status: Fulfilled Promises, Unfinished
Business in Libel Law on the Golden Anniversary of Sullivan, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 47
(2014).
3
Twiqbal is the shortened form of the two cases in which the Supreme Court articulated its
new interpretation of Rule 8(a). I use the term “Twiqbal standard” as a shorthand reference
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requires a court to evaluate a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by,
first, discarding conclusory allegations, and second, determining whether the
remaining factual allegations state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” While
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) permits malice to be pleaded “generally,”4
all Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have applied the
plausibility standard to allegations of malice under Rule 9(b).5 The result is a
distortion of Rule 9(b) that gives virtual immunity to defendants who are sued
for libel by public-figure plaintiffs and raises potential Erie issues when state
pleading standards permit states of mind to be pleaded generally.
Analyzing the pleading of actual malice in libel actions post-Twiqbal
demonstrates the deleterious effects of the plausibility standard on the proper
functioning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirement that a
public-figure plaintiff prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence
was designed to make it harder for public figures to use the tort system to deter
robust speech, even false speech.6 Imposing a higher proof standard was necessary to vindicate First Amendment values.7 However, the notice function of the
federal rules was unaffected by this higher substantive requirement. PostSullivan, it was still sufficient to allege actual malice in general terms.8 Because
it was assumed that plaintiffs would need discovery to unearth facts relevant to
the defendant’s state of mind, plaintiffs were not required to plead the evidence
that they would use eventually to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the
statement’s falsity or its reckless disregard for the truth.
This Article will examine the development of Circuit precedent on the
pleading of actual malice in libel actions by public-figure plaintiffs. Part I will
lay the groundwork, briefly reviewing the history of Rule 9(b) and the plausibility pleading standard introduced by Twombly and Iqbal, and discussing the
“actual malice” standard that must be met by plaintiffs who are public figures.
Part II will examine how the Circuits have overlain the Twiqbal pleading standard onto the language of Rule 9(b) with respect to the pleading of malice in libel actions and will illustrate the effect of doing so by comparing pre-Twiqbal
cases with post-Twiqbal cases.9 Part III will discuss the larger policy implicafor both the plausibility pleading standard established in Twombly and the two-step process
for applying the standard set forth in Iqbal.
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
5
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016); Biro v. Condé Nast, 807
F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2015 (2016); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,
Inc., 674 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2012); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying Twiqbal
standard to allegation of “fault” in libel suit by non-public figure).
6
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7
Id. at 279–80.
8
See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1301 (3d ed. 2004).
9
Throughout this article, “defamation” and “libel” will be used interchangeably since the
majority of defamation actions discussed herein encompass libel. The exception is Mayfield
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tions of this approach, including the unintended consequences of extending the
plausibility standard to interpretation of Rule 9(b). Finally, the Article will conclude with some suggestions for ameliorating the detrimental consequences of
the Circuits’ approach.
I.   BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) has remained unchanged since its
promulgation, except for the stylistic revision adopted in 2007.10 It comprises
two sentences, the first of which states, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”11
This heightened pleading standard has three primary purposes. First, it “safeguard[s] potential defendants from lightly made claims charging the commission of acts that involve some degree of moral turpitude.”12 Second, the particularity requirement assumes that some claims of fraud are made “only for their
nuisance or settlement value” and permits these baseless claims to be “identified and disposed of early.”13 Finally, because claims of fraud “often are involved in attempts to reopen completed transactions,” courts should be certain
that “the alleged injustice is severe enough to warrant the . . . re-examination of
old and settled matters.”14 Thus, the particularity requirement reflects the drafters’ awareness that defendants can be burdened by serious-sounding but meritless claims unless plaintiffs are deterred by a higher pleading standard.
The second sentence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) is in stark
contrast to the first: “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”15 The juxtaposition of the two sentences
clearly signals that “generally” is a less demanding standard than “with particularity.” Indeed, the dictionary definition of “generally” is “[w]ithout reference
to particular instances or details, not specifically.”16 This provision recognizes
v. National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369 (2012), which involved allegedly slanderous statements made at a press conference.
10
See William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1987).
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
12
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1296, at 31.
13
Id. at 37.
14
Id. Other reasons include deterring plaintiffs from filing suit “in order to discover whether
unknown wrongs actually have occurred—the classic fear of ‘fishing expeditions’ ”—and to
give adequate notice to the defendant since “fraud and mistake embrace such a wide variety
of potential conduct . . . .” Id. at 38, 39.
15
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
16
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 755 (3d ed. 1996). The
original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9(b) cited the English Rules Under the Judicature
Act, Order 19, Rule 22, which reads as follows: “ ‘Wherever it is material to allege malice,
fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same
is to be inferred.’ ” English Order 19, Rule 22 (1936), quoted in 1 PALMER D. EDMUNDS,
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 432 n.49 (1938).
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the “difficulty inherent in describing a state of mind with any degree of exactitude.”17 The drafters were not concerned that permitting states of mind to be
alleged generally would result in abuse by plaintiffs. When the defendant’s
state of mind is an element of a cause of action, that state of mind must generally be inferred from objective evidence, in the absence of an admission by the
defendant. To plead state of mind with particularity would require the pleading
of evidence, resulting in “complexity and prolixity.”18 Thus, Rule 9(b) “permits
a general allegation using the term ‘malicious’ if this allegation is necessary to
the cause of action.”19
Or, at least, that is how matters stood in 2007, when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.20 In Twombly, the Court interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to require the plaintiffs in an antitrust action to state a “plausible” claim of conspiracy.21 Rule 8(a)(2) reads as
follows: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”22
Prior to Twombly, the standard for determining whether a complaint was sufficient under Rule 8(a) had been articulated in Conley v. Gibson23: “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”24 The Court in Twombly “retire[d]” the Conley standard,25 substituting a test that requires plaintiffs to plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”26 According to the Court,
the plausibility requirement “does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage,”27 nor does it “apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard.”28 Instead, the Court explained,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of

17

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1301, at 290.
Id.
19
1A WILLIAM W. BARRON & HON. ALEXANDER HOLTZHOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE WITH FORMS § 303, at 549 (rules ed. 1960) (revised by Charles Alan Wright).
20
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Twombly has been widely discussed
and closely examined in the scholarly literature. For more detailed analyses of the case, see
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1067–81 (2009);
Richard A. Duncan & Brian S. McCormac, If It Takes Two to Tango, Do They Conspire?:
Twombly and Standards of Pleading Conspiracy, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 39 (2007).
21
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
22
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
23
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
24
Id. at 45–46.
25
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
26
Id. at 570.
27
Id. at 556.
28
Id. at 569 n.14.
18

17 NEV. L.J. 709 CORNETT - FINAL.DOCX

Summer 2017]

5/10/17 2:31 PM

PLEADING ACTUAL MALICE

713

his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.29

Applying the new standard to the plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint, the Court
found the complaint insufficient.30 Because the plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrated only parallel conduct by competitors, two conceivable inferences could
be drawn: the competitors had agreed not to compete, which would be illegal;
or, the competitors were independently following the same course of action,
which would not be illegal. According to the Twombly Court, the district court
was not required to draw the inference of illegal agreement.31 Rather, it was up
to the plaintiffs to plead facts that would “nudge[] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”32
The adoption of this new standard was viewed with dismay by many commentators.33 They saw Twombly as destabilizing a pleading system that had
been in place since the adoption of the federal rules in 1938, swinging the pendulum too far from the liberal standard intended by the drafters toward a standard that would deter the filing of meritorious suits by setting the pre-filing investigation bar too high.34 However, some commentators took comfort in the
belief that Twombly was limited to the antitrust context or, alternatively, required only pleading practices that were already in wide use, given plaintiffs’
propensity to incorporate factual detail into their complaints.35
However, the hopes of those who saw Twombly as a limited decision were
dashed with the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,36 in which a post-911 detainee sued the former Attorney General and the former Director of the FBI,
alleging that his detention resulted from racial, religious, and national origin
discrimination.37 In Iqbal the Court held that the new plausibility pleading
standard applies to all cases.38 The Court also clarified how lower courts should
29

Id. at 555 (citations omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Id. at 569.
31
Id. at 564–68.
32
Id. at 570.
33
See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L. REV. BRIEF 135 (2007); Mark Samson, Arizona Should Avoid Twombly’s Pernicious Effects, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Sept. 1, 2007, at 27. For a summary of reactions to Twombly, see Kendall
W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1824–28 (2008).
34
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109
MICH. L. REV. 53, 68 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010).
35
See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 605 (2007); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298–99 (2010).
36
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
37
Id. at 669.
38
Id. at 684.
30

17 NEV. L.J. 709 CORNETT - FINAL.DOCX

714

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

5/10/17 2:31 PM

[Vol. 17:709

go about applying the new standard. First, the court must identify allegations
that “are no more than conclusions.”39 Second, setting aside these conclusions,
the court should peruse the “well-pleaded factual allegations, . . . assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.”40
Iqbal argued that his complaint was sufficient because Rule 9(b) permitted
him to allege the defendants’ discriminatory intent generally.41 Responding to
this argument, the Court labelled the general allegation of intent a “conclusory
statement[]” which the court was not required to treat as true.42 Instead, the
Court interpreted Rule 9(b) as follows:
But “generally” is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared
to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely
excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading
standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still operative—strictures of Rule 8.43

Ironically, to support the proposition that the second sentence of Rule 9(b)
is subject to Rule 8, the Court cited and quoted Wright and Miller’s Federal
Practice and Procedure:
“[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of a condition of mind would be
undesirable because, absent overriding considerations pressing for a specificity
requirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mistake, the general ‘short
and plain statement of the claim’ mandate in Rule 8(a) . . . should control the second sentence of Rule 9(b).”44

However, when Wright and Miller made this statement in 2004, the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8(a) was governed by the Conley “no set of
facts” standard. The point of the quoted language was that, in contrast to the
particularity requirement of the first sentence of Rule 9(b), the second sentence
of Rule 9(b) required only the same kind of notice pleading required by Rule
8(a). It was only after the Twombly Court imposed the plausibility requirement
that applying Rule 8 to the second sentence of Rule 9(b) would require something more than a general allegation of state of mind.
II.   APPLYING TWIQBAL TO PLEADING ACTUAL MALICE
Iqbal’s command that pleading state of mind is subject to the plausibility
standard is exemplified in libel actions against public figures.45 When a public
39

Id. at 679.
Id.
41
Id. at 686.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 686–87.
44
Id. at 687 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1301, at 291).
45
Application of the plausibility pleading standard to states of mind will occur in other torts
in which intent, knowledge, or malice is an element, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and others. See, e.g., L. Foster Con40
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figure sues for libel, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly libelous statement was made
with “actual malice.”46 In this context, “actual malice” means, not ill will or hatred, but rather that the statement was made “with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity.”47 Such knowledge or reckless disregard is a
state of mind; the Court has held that actual malice is measured by a subjective,
not an objective, standard. 48 It is not enough for a libel plaintiff to prove that a
“reasonably prudent [person]” would not have published the defamatory statement. 49 Instead, “[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”50
As the Court’s references to proof and evidence indicate, prior to Twiqbal,
the actual malice element was understood as an evidentiary matter to be proved
at trial or disposed of on summary judgment.51 Consistent with the pre-Twiqbal
interpretation of Rule 9(b), the defendant’s state of mind with respect to publication of the defamatory statement could be pleaded generally. Pleading actual
malice required only a general allegation that the defendant acted with “actual
malice,” meaning that the defendant “knew” the statement was false or “acted
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity” or “entertained serious doubts”
about the truth of the statement.52 Now, however, the publisher’s state of mind
must be plausibly pleaded in order to avoid dismissal. Under the Twiqbal regime, it is no longer enough to plead that the defendant made the allegedly libelous statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as
to their truth or falsity.53 Such general statements are now branded as conclusulting, LLC v. XL Group, Inc., Civil No. 3:11CV800–REP, 2012 WL 2785904 at *11 (E.D.
Va. June 1, 2012) (relying on Mayfield in holding that following allegation was insufficient
to plead knowledge element of fraud: “ ‘XL Group knew at the time that he [sic] made these
material representations that the representations were false because it never intended to fulfill these representations’ ”).
46
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
47
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 510–11 (1991).
48
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12:75 (2d ed. 2015).
52
E.g., United States Med. Corp. v. M.D. Buyline, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (allegation that defendant acted with “actual malice” is sufficient to withstand 12(b)(6)
motion); Hoth v. Am. States Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 290, 293 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (allegation that
defendant acted “with reckless disregard” of statement’s falsity is sufficient to withstand
12(b)(6) motion); cf. Church of Scientology Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that first two elements of a libel action—whether the statement was made “of and
concerning” the plaintiff and whether the allegedly libelous statement could reasonably be
understood as defamatory—could be decided at the pleading stage, while the elements of
falsity and actual malice could be decided only after discovery). But cf. Moore v. Univ. of
Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (dismissing defamation claim because, inter alia, plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to establish actual malice).
53
See infra Part II.B.
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sions.54 Instead, facts must be pleaded to “nudge” the claim “across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”55 So far, no libel complaint filed by a public
figure that has reached a Circuit Court of Appeals has succeeded in plausibly
pleading actual malice.56
A.   The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized the law of defamation in 1964,
when it held, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution prohibits the award of damages to a public official in a
defamation action unless the plaintiff proves with “convincing clarity” that the
defendant acted with “actual malice.”57 According to the Court, this requirement is necessary to protect “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on
public issues.58 The Supreme Court recognized that the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan standard will stop some meritorious suits: “Plainly many deserving
plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to
surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.”59 Because knowledge of falsity and reckless disregard are subjective, plaintiffs must rely, in the absence of
admissions by the defendant, on inferences from circumstantial evidence.60 In
St. Amant v. Thompson,61 the Court elaborated on the types of circumstantial
evidence from which an inference of actual malice might be drawn. First, the
plaintiff could prove that the story was “fabricated.”62 Second, the plaintiff
could prove that the statement was “so inherently improbable that only a reckless [person] would have put [it] in circulation.”63 Third, the plaintiff could
prove that the statement was “based wholly” on an unreliable source which the
defendant had “obvious reasons to doubt,” such as an “unverified anonymous
telephone call.”64 In contrast, the Supreme Court held that “[a]lthough failure to
investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, . . . the purposeful
avoidance of the truth” will do so.65 The Circuit Courts of Appeals have held
that a publisher’s failure to corroborate statements, even from sources known to

54

See id.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 570, 570 (2007).
56
See infra Part II.B.
57
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964). The Court later extended this
principle to defamation actions by public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967).
58
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
59
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
60
Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2009).
61
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
62
Id. at 732.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989) (citations omitted).
55
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be unreliable, does not constitute actual malice.66 A known absence of corroboration of false statements also does not give rise to an inference of actual malice.67 Even the manufacturing of evidence to support the false statements is insufficient, standing alone, to prove actual malice.68 When an article “is
essentially an account of two sides of an issue” that “raises questions” in the
reader’s mind, no inference of actual malice arises from the fact that a reader
could accept one side of the issue over the other.69
These strict limits on public figures’ ability to successfully prosecute a libel suit traditionally applied only at the proof stage, and pre-Twiqbal appellate
decisions on actual malice tended to be reviews of jury verdicts or grants of
summary judgment.70 Pre-Twiqbal, federal courts routinely permitted publicfigure plaintiffs to plead generally that the alleged defamatory statement had
been made “with actual malice” or “with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.”71 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to recognize an editorial-process privilege on behalf of newspaper publishers,
holding that a libel plaintiff is entitled to discovery of the newspapers’ inner
workings in order to prove actual malice.72
B.   Applying Twiqbal in Public-Figure Libel Cases
To date, five reported cases from the Circuit Courts of Appeals have addressed the sufficiency of allegations of malice in public-figure libel actions
after Twiqbal.73 In each case, the appellate court affirmed Rule 12 dismissals in
favor of the defendant because the plaintiff’s allegation of malice did not meet
the plausibility requirement.
In the first case to address the issue, Schatz v. Republican State Leadership
Committee, the plaintiff was an unsuccessful Democratic candidate for the U.S.
Senate from Maine.74 Schatz sued the publisher of his opponent’s campaign
66

McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest Gov’t, Inc., 255 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2001).
68
Frakes v. Crete Carrier Corp., 579 F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2009).
69
Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 254 (1st Cir. 2002).
70
See, e.g., Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp.
1499 (D.S.C. 1989).
71
See, e.g., Howard, 294 F.3d at 245 (review of jury verdict); Campbell, 255 F.3d at 560
(same); Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (review of summary judgment);
Frakes, 579 F.3d at 426 (same); Kaelin v. Globe Commc’n Corp., 162 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1998) (same); McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1501 (same).
72
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
73
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686 (11th Cir. 2016); Biro v. Condé Nast, 807
F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2015 (2016); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing,
Inc., 674 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2012); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying Twiqbal
standard to allegation of “fault” in libel suit by non-public figure).
74
Schatz, 669 F.3d at 54.
67
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brochures and other advertisements for libel based upon the statement that he,
as a city selectman, had voted to cancel the city’s Fourth of July fireworks display, instead giving the money for the fireworks display to a “political organization.”75 Schatz claimed that this statement was false and defamatory because
it implied that the $10,000 of public money it would have cost to put on the
fireworks show was given directly, by him, to his own political organization,
which would have been a criminal act.76
Affirming the dismissal of the complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion, the First
Circuit held that the plaintiff failed adequately to plead actual malice by alleging that the defendant “had ‘knowledge’ that its statements were ‘false’ or had
‘serious doubts’ about their truth and a ‘reckless disregard’ for whether they
were false.”77 These allegations, which would have been sufficient pre-Twiqbal,
were characterized by the First Circuit as “actual-malice buzzwords.”78 The
complaint also alleged that the defendant had relied on only two newspaper articles and had maliciously linked the article about cancellation of the fireworks
display with the article about the city’s gift of money to a political organization
unaffiliated with the plaintiff.79 Schatz argued that this unjustified linking of the
two articles, plus the defendant’s failure to conduct any additional investigation, demonstrated a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements.80 But the court rejected his argument, holding that the allegedly false
statement “synced up with or at least was not out of line with what the [newspaper] stories said.”81 Any defamatory inference that might arise from the juxtaposition of the two articles resulted from pure negligence, not malice, said the
court.82 Furthermore, the defendant’s failure to investigate further did not constitute actual malice in the absence of some “obvious reason to doubt [the] veracity” of the articles.83 Thus, the reviewing court affirmed the district court’s
evaluation of the circumstances set forth in the complaint, deciding as a matter
of law that these facts did not rise to the level of actual malice.84
The First Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that its standard for
pleading actual malice was actually higher than the Twiqbal standard. The court
stated:
Sure, malice is not a matter that requires particularity in pleading—like other
states of mind, it “may be alleged generally.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). But, to
make out a plausible malice claim, a plaintiff must still lay out enough facts

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. (quoting Levesque v Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2009)).
Id.
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from which malice might reasonably be inferred—even in a world with
Twombly and Iqbal.85

Mayfield v. National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR)
represents another instance in which the appellate court rejected general allegations of malice that would have been sufficient pre-Twiqbal and, instead, ruled
as a matter of law that the facts the plaintiff was able to present in the complaint were insufficient to state a claim.86 There, race car driver Jeremy Mayfield sued the governing body of stock car racing, NASCAR, for libel.87 Mayfield failed a drug test, which indicated that he had ingested
methamphetamine.88 He told NASCAR that “he had ingested Claritin-D for allergies and Adderall XR for a claimed recent diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.”89 However, NASCAR’s CEO held a press conference in
which he stated “that Mayfield had been suspended because he took a ‘performance enhancing’ or ‘recreational’ drug.”90 The complaint alleged that the
CEO’s statements “ ‘were known by [them] to be false at the time they were
made, were malicious or were made with reckless disregard as to their veracity.’ ”91
The Fourth Circuit held that this allegation of malice “is entirely insufficient” under Twiqbal: “This kind of conclusory allegation—a mere recitation of
the legal standard—is precisely the sort of allegations that Twombly and Iqbal
rejected.”92 In response to the plaintiff’s argument that malice need only be
pleaded “generally” pursuant to Rule 9(b), the court cited Iqbal in holding that
“Rule 9(b) ensures there is no heightened pleading standard for malice, but
malice must still be alleged in accordance with Rule 8—a ‘plausible’ claim for
relief must be articulated.”93 The plaintiff’s additional allegations—that the defendants “intended to harm Mayfield by publishing his test results,” that the
drug testing agency did not follow proper procedures, and that the defendants
knew prior to the press conference that Mayfield denied ingesting the illegal

85

Id. In a case decided soon after Schatz, Shay v. Walters, the First Circuit again held that a
private plaintiff, who was required by Massachusetts law to show “fault” on the part of the
defendant, failed to plausibly plead fault by alleging that the defamatory statements were
published with “ill will” and “actual malice.” Shay v. Walters, 702 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.
2012). These allegations failed to satisfy the Twiqbal standard, held the court, because they
are “bare conclusions, unembellished by pertinent facts.” Id. at 82–83. The court in Shay did
not refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) at all.
86
Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, 674 F.3d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2012).
87
Id. at 374.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 378.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 377 (emphasis in original). The court also cited its own precedent, Hatfill v. New
York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that “the usual standards of notice pleading apply in defamation cases.” Id.
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drug—also did not satisfy the plausibility requirement.94 Implicitly, the court
held that the defendant was under no obligation to supplement its statement
with Mayfield’s denial. Ultimately, the court held that the allegedly defamatory
statements “did no more than report what the positive drug tests indicated—that
Mayfield took a recreational or performance-enhancing drug.”95 The court affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings.
Similarly, in Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Scottie Pippen’s libel suit against several publishers on
grounds that he failed plausibly to allege actual malice.96 The defendants had
falsely stated that the former NBA player had filed for bankruptcy.97 Defendants conceded the falsity of this statement and also conceded that, had they investigated official court records or interviewed Pippen himself, they would
have known that the statement was false.98 Pippen alleged that this failure to
investigate, coupled with the defendants’ failure to retract the statement once
Pippen notified them of its falsity, demonstrated actual malice.99 However, the
court, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, noted that neither a failure to investigate nor a failure to retract a false statement constitute actual malice.100
Therefore, the complaint failed plausibly to allege actual malice.
In the fourth case, Biro v. Condé Nast, the Second Circuit affirmed the
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiff’s libel suit because he failed plausibly to
allege actual malice.101 Biro, an art dealer who gained fame for authenticating
paintings using fingerprint analysis, alleged that a New Yorker article defamed
him by “rais[ing] questions about the trustworthiness of Biro’s methods and his
authentication of paintings.”102 The article also “contained interviews of various
individuals critical of Biro, and it suggested that Biro stood to profit from some
of his more dubious authentications.”103 In his complaint, Biro alleged that the
defendants “ ‘either knew or believed or had reason to believe that many of the
statements of fact in the Article were false or inaccurate, and nonetheless published them,’ and that they ‘acted with actual malice, or in reckless disregard of
the truth, or both.’ ”104
Going beyond these general allegations, Biro also alleged a number of other facts. First, the defendants “failed to ‘investigate and determine the validity’

94

Id. at 378.
Id.
96
Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2013).
97
Id. at 612.
98
Id. at 614.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 542 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2015
(2016).
102
Id. at 543.
103
Id.
104
Id.
95
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of the allegedly defamatory statements.”105 Second, they “relied on anonymous
and biased sources.”106 Third, they “ignore[d] the many other works of art
which plaintiff has worked with over the years, as well as his many satisfied
clients.”107 Fourth, they failed to retract the article and failed to remove the story from the internet.108 Fifth, some defendants chose to publish the article after
Biro had already sued other defendants for libel.109 Finally, one defendant has
“ ‘defamatory propensities.’ ”110
These allegations were insufficient, held the court.111 Cataloguing what the
complaint did not allege, the court noted the absence of any allegation that the
article was based “ ‘wholly’ on information from unverified and anonymous
sources.”112 Nor did the complaint “allege facts that would have prompted the
New Yorker defendants to question the reliability of any of the named or unnamed sources at the time the Article was published.”113 Nor was the author’s
“decision to focus on Biro’s controversial authentications, while ignoring both
his other authentications and his satisfied clients”114 evidence of actual malice.
Biro argued that the court should not apply the Twiqbal plausibility standard to his allegation of actual malice because Rule 9(b) allows it to be pleaded
generally and because neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had
applied Twiqbal to defamation cases.115 But the Second Circuit rejected this argument, noting that Iqbal required intent to be pleaded plausibly, and rejected
the view that Rule 9(b) constitutes a “ ‘license to evade the less rigid—though
still operative—strictures of Rule 8.’ ”116 Citing Pippen, Mayfield, and Schatz,
the court noted that Biro had not presented “a persuasive reason why the pleading standard should differ in defamation cases generally or in the malice inquiry specifically.”117 In contrast, the court opined, the imposition of the plausibility pleading standard will not prove fatal to public-figure plaintiffs.118 First,
the court noted that “a court typically will infer actual malice from objective
facts,” and that “whether actual malice can plausibly be inferred will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case.”119 Moreover, citing three district

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court cases, the court noted that “[i]n practice, requiring that actual malice be
plausibly alleged has not doomed defamation cases against public figures.”120
Biro filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the Twiqbal standard should not apply to allegations of
actual malice in a libel action, and that application of Twiqbal to the allegations
of malice violates the Erie doctrine.121 The petition argued that applying Twiqbal to allegations of actual malice is tantamount to amending Rule 9(b) without
complying with the Rules Enabling Act.122 Moreover, even if Twiqbal applies,
the allegation that a defendant acted “with actual malice” is neither a legal conclusion nor a threadbare recitation of an element of a libel action.123 Instead, it
is “a purely factual assertion about that person’s subjective state of mind.”124
As such, the petition argued, that allegation is entitled to the same presumption
of truth accorded to other factual allegations.125 Although the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Biro, probably because there was no Circuit split, these are
the arguments that must be addressed to reconcile the Twiqbal standard with
the second sentence of Rule 9(b) in public-figure libel suits.126
Finally, in Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
12(b)(6) dismissal of a defamation action filed by rap artist Prakazrel (“Pras”)
Michel against the New York Post.127 Although the District Court’s action was
based upon its finding that the article “presented only non-actionable statements of opinion under New York law,”128 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
Twiqbal grounds, holding that “Michel has failed to adequately plead facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants published the article with
actual malice.”129 Michel alleged that the New York Post defamed him by reporting that he had been a “no-show” and had “bailed on” a charity show for
“his own foundation.”130 The complaint alleged that the article was published
120

Id. at 545–46 (citing Tiversa Holding Corp. v. LabMD Inc., Civ. A. No. 13–1296, 2014
WL 1584211, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2014); Lynch v. Ackley, Civ. No. 3:12CV537 (JBA),
2012 WL 6553649, at *9 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2012); Ciemniecki v. Parker McCay P.A., Civ.
No. 09–6450 (RBK/KMW), 2010 WL 2326209, at *14 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010)).
121
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Biro v. Condé Nast, 136 S. Ct. 2015 (No. 15–1123)
(2016), 2016 WL 880298. The petition also argued that a public-figure plaintiff should be
entitled to discovery once the court determines that the “complained-of language is susceptible of a defamatory connotation,” and that First Amendment protection should extend only
to “statements which are germane to the controversy and matters of public concern.” Id. at i.
122
Id. at 23.
123
Id. at 23–24.
124
Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
125
Id.
126
See supra Part I. The Petition also argued that application of the plausibility standard violated the Erie doctrine because that standard would not have been applied in state court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 29. See infra Part III.
127
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 691–92 (11th Cir. 2016).
128
Id. at 691.
129
Id. at 692.
130
Id. at 692–93.
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with “a ‘blatant reckless disregard for the truth.’ ”131 To support the allegation
of recklessness, the plaintiff alleged, first, that “Defendants wrote, published
and disseminated the Article without conducting any due diligence on the matter covered or attempting any real outreach to uncover if any truth existed relating to the matter that was being asserted therein.”132 Second, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was informed, two days prior to the article’s
publication, that Michel was not a board member of the foundation, but still
characterized the foundation as “his own.”133
In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the plausibility pleading standard should not be applied to his allegations of actual malice, the Eleventh Circuit joined the “chorus” of previous courts of appeals decisions holding that the
Twiqbal standard does apply.134 Next, the court executed the first step of Iqbal,
disregarding the plaintiff’s “conclusory” allegation that the Post was “reckless”
in publishing the article.135 The two supporting allegations that remained, according to the court, alleged only a failure to investigate, which is legally insufficient to support a finding of actual malice.136 Also militating against a finding
of actual malice was the Post’s correct reporting that Michel’s name, which had
been listed as a foundation Board member on its website, had disappeared from
the website prior to the article’s publication.137 Holding that the plaintiff had
failed plausibly to plead actual malice, the court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint but granted the plaintiff leave to amend.138
C.   A Successful Post-Twiqbal Libel Complaint
It is not impossible for a public figure to recover on a libel claim in a postTwiqbal world. In a highly publicized case, Nicole Eramo, a former Dean at the
University of Virginia, won a jury verdict of $3 million against Rolling Stone

131

Id. at 693.
Id. at 704.
133
Id. at 704–05.
134
Id. at 702 (citing Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 741 (2d. Cir. 2015); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2012); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm.,
669 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2012)). The court included in the chorus a Tenth Circuit case, McDonald v. Wise, in which the court applied the plausibility pleading standard to a defamation
claim by a private individual because the statements regarded an “issue of public concern.”
McDonald v. Wise, 769 F.3d 1202, 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2014). The court held that the seventy-seven factual paragraphs of the complaint satisfied the Twiqbal standard by permitting
an inference that the defendant knew that her charge of sexual harassment against the plaintiff was false. Id. at 1220.
135
Michel, 816 F.3d at 703–04.
136
Id. at 704.
137
In his brief to the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff made two additional allegations supporting actual malice, but the court refused to consider these allegations because they had not
been included in the complaint. Id. at 705–06.
138
Id. at 706.
132
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magazine and a reporter, Sabrina Rubin Erdely.139 The case arose from an article written by Erdely and published in the December 4, 2014 edition of Rolling
Stone entitled “A Rape on Campus.”140 The article reported the violent gang
rape of a University of Virginia (“UVA”) undergraduate, identified only as
“Jackie,” by a group of fraternity brothers at a fraternity party.141 According to
the article, when “Jackie” finally reported the rape, Dean Nicole Eramo reacted
with indifference or with “coddling” designed to discourage “Jackie” from reporting the rape to the police and to suppress the story from being publicly reported.142
The sensational article garnered publicity in other media outlets regarding
the “rape culture” on college campuses, but it also quickly garnered some skeptical news commentary pointing out the apparent gaps and flaws in the reporting of the story.143 During this post-publication period, reporter Erdely embarked upon a press tour and gave interviews to several news outlets in which
she defended the journalistic integrity of the article.144 However, Rolling Stone
became so concerned by criticism of the article that it commissioned a study of
the article by the Columbia Journalism Review.145 The review concluded that
the article was “a journalistic failure that was avoidable.”146 Likewise, the Charlottesville Police Department, which had begun an investigation of “Jackie’s”
story at UVA’s request, concluded that “[t]here is no substantive basis to support the account alleged in the Rolling Stone article.”147
Armed with the Columbia Journalism Review report and the findings of the
Charlottesville Police Department investigation, Nicole Eramo sued Rolling
Stone and Erdely in state court in Charlottesville, Virginia.148 The complaint,
comprising 296 paragraphs in seventy-six pages, reads like the script for a television exposé.149 It describes Eramo’s career and Erdely’s prior journalistic endeavors, quotes liberally from interviews and statements given by Erdely and
her editor, Scott Woods, subsequent to the article’s publication, and describes

139

Hawes Spencer & Ben Sisario, In Rolling Stone Defamation Case, Magazine and Reporter Ordered to Pay $3 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/20
16/11/08/business/media/in-rolling-stone-defamation-case-magazine-and-reporter-orderedto-pay-3-million.html [https://perma.cc/4UPE-NE7L].
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Complaint at 22, Eramo v. Rolling Stone LLC, No. CL15–205 (W.D. Va. May 29, 2015).
143
Id. at 28–31.
144
Id. at 7, 26–27.
145
Sheila Coronel et al., Rolling Stone’s Investigation: ‘A Failure that Was Avoidable,’
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 5, 2015), cjr.org/investigation/rolling_stone_investiga
tion.php [https://perma.cc/2WJW-SW7W].
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
The defendants subsequently removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
149
See generally Complaint, supra note 142.
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the reaction to the article of the University, the Psi Phi fraternity, other UVA
students, and friends of “Jackie.”
The complaint repeatedly alleged actual malice. In the “Nature of the Action” section, plaintiff alleged that “Erdely and Rolling Stone acted with actual
malice when they published ‘A Rape on Campus.’ ”150 In the “Facts” section,
plaintiff alleged actual malice in seven subheadings, reading as follows:
Erdely and Rolling Stone Publish “A Rape on Campus” With Actual Malice
By Making A Calculated Decision Not To Pressure-Test Jackie’s Claims In Order To Publish A Biased, Preconceived Narrative Despite Serious Doubts About
The Credibility Of Their Sole Source.151
Erdely and Rolling Stone Act With Actual Malice By Purposefully Avoiding
Obtaining A FERPA Waiver To Access University Records That Would Have
Contradicted Rolling Stone’s and Erdely’s Preconceived Storyline.152
Erdely and Rolling Stone Act With Actual Malice By Making A Calculated
Decision To Hide From Public View That They Were Relying Entirely On A
Single Source Who They Subjectively Doubted.153
Erdely and Rolling Stone Acted With Actual Malice When They Rejected
Jackie’s Request To Withdraw From The Story Because Jackie Was Uncomfortable With How The Article Would Portray Dean Eramo.154
Erdely and Rolling Stone Acted With Actual Malice by Making A Calculated
Decision Not To Seek Meaningful Comment From Phi Kappa Psi.155
Erdely and Rolling Stone Acted With Actual Malice By Interviewing And
Disregarding Sources And The Information They Provided About Dean Eramo.156
Erdely and Rolling Stone Acted With Actual Malice By Repeatedly Lying In
An Effort To Bolster The Credibility Of Their False Story.157

Each of these subheadings was followed by a series of paragraphs replete
with quotations from Erdely, Woods, and students, as well as with facts reported by the Columbia Journalism Review or the Charlottesville Police Department.158 Finally, in each of the six defamation counts, the complaint included
the following allegations:
At minimum, Erdely and Rolling Stone had serious doubts as to the truth of
these statements and a high degree of awareness that they were probably false,
and therefore were required to investigate their veracity before publishing them.
Erdely and Rolling Stone’s failure to do so amounts to actual malice.
Erdely and Rolling Stone purposefully avoided the truth, and purposely
avoided interviewing sources and following fundamental reporting practices intentionally in order to avoid the truth.
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id. at 6.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
See, e.g., id. at 51–53.
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At the time of publication, Erdely and Rolling Stone knew these statements
were false, or recklessly disregarded the truth.159

Interestingly, the defendants failed to file a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
complaint.160
It may well have been that the defendants could not, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, make a motion to dismiss on Twiqbal grounds
given the level of factual detail in the complaint. Because no Twiqbal motion
was made, the court did not hold explicitly that the complaint satisfied the
Twiqbal standard. Although there has been no explicit ruling that the Eramo
complaint satisfied the Twiqbal plausibility standard, we can infer its sufficiency given the plethora of facts contained in the complaint and the failure of the
defendants to challenge its sufficiency. And we have no way of knowing
whether a less fulsome complaint would have been plausible. But, whether or
not the Eramo complaint represents the minimum necessary to satisfy the
Twiqbal standard, or whether it goes above and beyond what that standard requires, it is the best example we have of a successful post-Twiqbal libel complaint. From it, we can deduce at least two things.
First, a successful public-figure libel complaint is likely to be long, complex, and narrative. The Eramo complaint is novelistic: it has characters, a setting, and a plot. It is saturated with the plaintiff’s theory of the case. In Rule
8(a) terms, it honors the phrase “showing the pleader is entitled to relief” over
the phrase “short and plain statement of the claim.”161 Transforming the complaint into a novelistic narrative is not necessarily a bad thing; indeed, the storytelling aspect of the complaint makes for an entertaining first step in the litigation, and according to some scholars, is what plaintiffs’ lawyers have always
produced.162
We might well ask what is wrong with asking the plaintiff to tell her story
in the complaint. After all, the plaintiff must know what has happened in order
to bring the suit. The plaintiff’s lawyer must not sign the complaint unless the
“factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,
will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.”163 It is true that the plaintiff will know the follow159

See, e.g., id. at 62.
Because it has been uniformly held that federal pleading standards are procedural for
Erie purposes, the Twiqbal standard would have applied to the Complaint once it was removed to federal court. Therefore, if the Complaint did not satisfy the Twiqbal standard, it
would have been vulnerable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
161
FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Because the complaint was originally filed in Virginia state court, we
might surmise that the length and complexity of the complaint might be due to state pleading
requirements. However, Virginia’s pleading rule states, “Brevity is enjoined as the outstanding characteristic of good pleading. In any pleading a simple statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the essential facts is sufficient.” VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:4(j).
162
See generally Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987 (2003).
163
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
160
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ing elements of the cause of action for libel: the words’ publication, the defamatory nature of the words, the falsity of the words, and the damages suffered
because of the publication of the words. But the plaintiff may not know the
subjective state of the defendant’s mind at the time of publication. Whether the
defendant acted negligently, recklessly, or with knowledge of the words’ falsity—i.e., whether the defendant acted with “actual malice”—is usually solely
within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant.
Second, we can deduce that a successful public-figure libel plaintiff will
have extensive pre-filing facts about how the defamatory publication came into
being, including the defendant’s state of mind. The plaintiff in Eramo was in
the unusual position of having the evidence, before the filing of the complaint,
of the defendant’s state of mind at the time the defamatory article was published. The Columbia Journalism Review had access to Erdely’s notes as well
as documents relating to “editing, editorial supervision and fact-checking.”164
Eramo also had a police investigation of the underlying incident.165 As alleged
in the complaint, and as verified by the jury verdict, those facts were legally
sufficient to permit a jury to infer that the defendants acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the article. But few defendants will commission a
neutral third party to assess their editorial products. And few articles will be
subject to the factual scrutiny of a criminal investigation by a police department. Without access to these two sources, it is doubtful that Eramo could have
successfully pleaded actual malice. Thus, the success of the Eramo complaint
does nothing to dispel the catch-22 that ensnares an ordinary public figure suing for libel.
III.   IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING TWIQBAL TO ALLEGATIONS OF MALICE
Imposing the Twiqbal plausibility standard onto the pleading of actual malice has at least three implications. First, it distorts the language and purpose of
Rule 9(b) by requiring that the libel plaintiff plead facts about the defendant’s
state of mind that the plaintiff usually has no way of knowing. Because discovery is not available under Twiqbal until the 12(b)(6) hurdle is surmounted, the
use of the plausibility standard in public-figure libel actions works a grave injustice to plaintiffs. Faced with a substantive standard that, for good reason, is
higher than normal, they are also faced with a pleading standard that is virtually
insurmountable, for reasons that are unclear at best.
The Twombly Court suggested that the plausibility standard is needed to
spare defendants the trouble and expense of discovery in cases that might eventually prove to be nonmeritorious.166 However, the Iqbal Court’s holding that
the plausibility standard applies to all cases, whatever the risk of expensive discovery, eviscerated any apparent rationale for tightening the standard. Yet, the
164
165
166

Coronel et al., supra note 145.
See Complaint, supra note 142, at 35–39.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
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plausibility standard bars plaintiffs from discovery whether or not discovery in
the particular case might prove to be overly burdensome or expensive for the
defendant. And in cases where the defendant’s state of mind must ultimately be
proven by the plaintiff—like public-figure libel cases—the bar to discovery
puts plaintiffs in a catch-22 situation. The plaintiff must allege facts from
which knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity must be inferred, but the plaintiff has no access to the tools of discovery with which to
learn these essential facts.167 Thus, applying the Twiqbal standard to allegations
of actual malice disrupts the drafters’ intended relationship between pleading
and discovery.
The proper functioning of Rule 9(b) in a libel action is illustrated by the
Ninth Circuit’s pre-Twombly decision in Flowers v. Carville.168 There, the
plaintiff, Gennifer Flowers, alleged that she had had an affair with President
Bill Clinton.169 To give credence to her allegations, she called a press conference at which she played tapes of telephone conversations between the two.170
Subsequently, several news outlets reported that the tapes appeared to have
been “selectively edited.”171 Relying on these reports, two of Clinton’s advisors,
James Carville and George Stephanopoulos, asserted that the tapes had been
“doctored.”172 Flowers sued the two for libel, and the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.173 The Ninth Circuit, speaking through Judge
Kozinski, held that the complaint stated a claim for libel.174 The complaint alleged, “without alleging corroborating evidence,”175 that the “defendants knew
that their statements were false or acted with reckless disregard of the truth.”176
This allegation was sufficient because Rule 9(b) permits state of mind to be alleged generally, “that is, simply by saying that [it] exist[s].”177 Judge Kosinski
recognized that “[t]he First Amendment imposes substantive requirements on
the state of mind a public figure must prove in order to recover for defamation,
but it doesn’t require him to prove that state of mind in the complaint.”178 Indeed the court correctly noted that the “clear and convincing” evidence required by the New York Times standard can be gathered only through discovery, and that the strength of that evidence can be tested only on summary
judgment:
167

Other scholars have noted this catch-22. E.g., Dodson, supra note 34; Miller, supra note
34; Steinman, supra note 35.
168
Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002).
169
Id. at 1122.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1131.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1130.
177
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
178
Id.
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Actual malice is a subjective standard that turns on the defendant’s state of
mind; it is typically proven by evidence beyond the defamatory publication itself. For that reason, “the issue of ‘actual malice’ . . . cannot be properly disposed of by a motion to dismiss,” where the plaintiff has had no opportunity to
present evidence in support of his allegations. The district court threw out Flowers’s lawsuit before she had a chance to depose witnesses, request documents
and otherwise pursue evidence necessary to her case through the discovery process. It may be improbable that Flowers will find evidence to support her claims,
but improbable is not the same as impossible . . . . Because Flowers has had no
chance to present evidence supporting her claims, we cannot hold that defendants acted without actual malice as a matter of law.
Flowers no doubt faces an uphill battle on remand. To survive summary
judgment, she will have to marshal clear and convincing evidence that defendants knew the news reports were probably false or disregarded obvious warning
signs from other sources. The difficulty of her task ahead, however, is no reason
to deny her the opportunity to make the attempt.179

To be sure, the decision in Flowers potentially subjected two busy, highprofile people to discovery. But this result was contemplated by the drafters.
Few defendants in our American system of justice are absolutely immune from
being held accountable in court for their wrongful acts. The doctrine of qualified immunity has evolved to protect important actors from frivolous or harassing litigation. But the plausibility standard in public-figure libel cases has developed into something very like it, conferring a de facto immunity, ironically,
on publishers, who are more likely to have litigation resources, at the expense
of individual plaintiffs who believe, and whose lawyers have a reasonable factual and legal basis to believe,180 that they have been wronged.181
Perhaps this concern is diminished in public-figure libel cases in which the
plaintiffs are themselves busy and important people.182 After all, Scottie Pippen
and Jeremy Mayfield, for example, participate in lucrative professional sports;
their wealth and fame depend upon their willingness to put themselves into
public view in the marketplace. It is unclear how solicitously the civil justice
system should treat such plaintiffs, especially compared to the solicitude that is
due to media defendants.183 But even public figures should have access to civil
179

Id. at 1131 (footnote and citation omitted).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
181
See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) (finding a disproportionate effect on civil rights and employment
discrimination plaintiffs).
182
This generalization is less true for limited purpose public figures, who may simply be, for
example, local elected officials or University deans.
183
Compare, Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards
in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012); Raymond
H. Brescia & Edward J. Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of Motion Practice in Civil Rights Litigation under the New Plausibility Standard, 47 AKRON L.
REV. 329 (2014); Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out
for Civil Rights and Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719 (2013);
180
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justice. As Judge Kozinski recognized, the New York Times standard adequately balances the respective rights of public figures and media defendants.184
However, as articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Michel, the plausibility
pleading standard supplements the New York Times standard:
In these cases, there is a powerful interest in ensuring that free speech is not unduly burdened by the necessity of defending against expensive yet groundless
litigation. Indeed, the actual malice standard was designed to allow publishers
the “breathing space” needed to ensure robust reporting on public figures and
events. Forcing publishers to defend inappropriate suits through expensive discovery proceedings in all cases would constrict that breathing space in exactly
the manner the actual malice standard was intended to prevent. The costs and efforts required to defend a lawsuit through that stage of litigation could chill free
speech nearly as effectively as the absence of the actual malice standard altogether.185

This policy justification for requiring plausibility pleading of actual malice
raises the question of whether the New York Times standard needs help to protect defendants adequately. The actual-malice standard was developed at a time
when actual malice could be pleaded generally, in what the Iqbal Court would
call a “conclusory” manner.186 Given the uniform results of using the plausibility standard to strengthen the New York Times standard, the overlay of an impossibly arduous pleading standard onto a rigorous substantive standard tips the
scales too far in favor of defendants.
Judge Kozinski’s understanding of the relationship between a motion to
dismiss and a summary judgment motion underscores the second unintended
consequence of applying Twiqbal to actual malice allegations.187 Requiring
public-figure libel plaintiffs to plead facts to support an inference of actual malice transforms the complaint into a statement of evidence. It transforms the
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. It permits the
judge to decide, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff’s factual allegations—
which should be only the door-openers to discovery—would be sufficient to
support a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. As both courts and commentators
recognize, the judge who decides the merits of a case on the face of the complaint is usurping the constitutional role of the jury.188 This danger is enhanced
Schneider, supra note 181; Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural
Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010).
184
Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2002).
185
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
186
See supra text accompanying notes 69–71.
187
See Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1131.
188
See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 432
(Tenn. 2011) (rejecting Twiqbal standard on grounds, inter alia, that standard “raises potential concerns implicating the Tennessee constitutional mandate that ‘the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate’ ”) (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank,
233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (rejecting Twiqbal standard and noting that it “adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits”); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v.
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in public-figure libel cases because of the well-developed law about which
facts are not sufficient to prove actual malice.189 These principles, articulated in
cases on review from jury verdicts or post-discovery summary judgments, are
part and parcel of the First Amendment protection of media defendants.190 They
ensure that the focus remains on the defendant’s subjective state of mind, not
on an objective reasonableness standard. But, ironically, at the pleading stage,
plaintiffs often have access only to the sort of facts that give rise to an inference
of objective unreasonableness. Even if facts exist to prove that the defendant
knew that the defamatory statement was false, a plaintiff who is unable to depose that defendant will be unable to plead those facts in order to state a
claim.191 Indeed, applying the plausibility standard to allegations of actual malice virtually ensures that no defendant will even have to admit or deny his or
her state of mind.192
Third, applying Twiqbal to allegations of actual malice will, at worst, violate the Erie doctrine and, at best, promote forum-shopping. Several states
whose rules of civil procedure are based on the federal rules have rejected the
Twiqbal standard as being inconsistent with the notice function of their Rules
8(a). For example, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the Twiqbal pleading standard, reasoning that the discovery problems that prompted the new
standard were unique to the federal system, that such a change to the rules
should be made through the rulemaking process, and that the countervailing
policy of ensuring plaintiffs’ access to justice counseled against the change.193
Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the Twiqbal standard.194 Other
states have followed suit.195 In states that have rejected the plausibility standTwombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007); Miller, supra note 34, at 30 (noting that Twiqbal standard permits a
“trial-like scrutiny of the merits”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion:
The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
189
See supra Part II.B.
190
See supra cases cited in notes 58–68.
191
The circularity of this reasoning demonstrates the catch-22 to which public-figure libel
plaintiffs are subjected under Twiqbal.
192
Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that dismissal meant that defendants never had to answer complaint).
193
McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863.
194
Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 422 (Tenn. 2011).
195
See Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 607–
08 (Iowa 2012) (explicitly declining to adopt Twiqbal standard); Roth v. DeFelicecare, Inc.,
700 S.E.2d 183, 189–90 n.4 (W. Va. 2010) (noting that Twiqbal standard has not been
adopted by court and reiterating that “all that is required by a plaintiff is ‘fair notice’ ”). Cf.
Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208, 212–13 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (noting that
the Alabama Supreme Court has not adopted the Twiqbal standard); Cent. Mortg. Co. v.
Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011) (declining to
address change of standard explicitly, but noting that pleading standard remained “reasonable ‘conceivability’ ”); Smith v. State, No. 104,755, 2012 WL 1072756, at *6 (Kan. Ct. App.
Mar. 23, 2012) (unpublished opinion) (noting that Kansas Supreme Court has not adopted
Twiqbal standard). But see Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543–
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ard, and whose Rules 9(b) mirror the federal rule, actual malice can still be
pleaded generally. Thus, a state court defamation action by a public figure can
proceed in the absence of specific facts to support knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, while a federal court action would be dismissed. Although the differing outcomes between the state and federal actions
do not themselves indicate an Erie violation, the differing outcomes do indicate
the need for an Erie analysis.
Because the differing outcomes result from application of a federal rule of
civil procedure, the analysis in Hanna v. Plumer applies.196 Applying the Rules
Enabling Act (REA),197 Rule 8(a) will pass muster under subsection (a) if it
“really regulates procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law . . . .”198 Because pleading rules have typically
been viewed as procedural, it seems likely that the Twiqbal standard would be
viewed as “procedural” under subsection (a) of the REA. The final step in the
analysis addresses section (b) of the REA by asking whether application of the
federal rule would “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”199
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme
Court addressed a collision between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and a
New York statute regulating class actions, with the victory going to the Federal
Rule.200 Showing no deference to the New York statute, the Court held that
Rule 23 meant what it said: plaintiffs in federal court can file class action
suits.201 Because the class action rule is procedural, the majority held, it passes
the first part of the REA analysis.202 However, the second part of the analysis—
whether Rule 23 abridged, modified, or enlarged any substantive right—was
decided by a plurality, joined by Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.203
44 (D.C. 2011) (adopting Twiqbal due to statutory mandate to follow the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); Doe v. Bd. of Regents, 788 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010) (adopting Twiqbal standard but cautioning, “[i]n cases in which a plaintiff does not or cannot allege specific
facts showing a necessary element, the factual allegations, taken as true, are nonetheless
plausible if they suggest the existence of the element and raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the element or claim.”); Sisney v. Best, Inc., 754 N.W.2d
804, 808–09 (S.D. 2008) (adopting Twiqbal standard).
196
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The applicable analysis is colloquially known as
a “Hanna Part 2” analysis. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 207–08 (7th ed. 2013). A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that this
is the proper analysis when facing a conflict between state law and a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
197
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
198
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464.
199
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
200
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431.
201
Id. at 1442.
202
See id. at 1444.
203
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 996 (1977). Under the doctrine of Marks, Justice Stevens’s view must be taken as the view of the Court on this issue.
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Justice Stevens agreed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 could be
applied.204 He addressed the second part of the Hanna analysis by asking
whether the New York law, while procedural in form, “is so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created
right.”205 Because the New York law “applies not only to claims based on New
York law but also to claims based on federal law or the law of any other State,”
Justice Stevens found that it did not “serve[] the function of defining New
York’s rights or remedies.”206
Although the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure triumphed in Shady Grove,
Justice Stevens’s analysis is highly relevant to an analysis of whether application of the Twiqbal pleading standard in public-figure libel cases violates the
Erie doctrine. First, Justice Stevens warns that the REA reflects Congress’s
careful balancing of respect for state-created substantive rights and federal procedure.207 This careful balance requires that a reviewing court look carefully at
both the conflicting state law and the federal rule. In particular, the analysis
“does not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of
what is traditionally described as substantive or procedural. Rather, it turns on
whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive
rights or remedies.”208 Justice Stevens quoted Judge Posner’s observation that
“[a] ‘state procedural rule, though undeniably “procedural” in the ordinary
sense of the term,’ may exist ‘to influence substantive outcomes.’ ”209 Justice
Stevens then concluded: “When a State chooses to use a traditionally procedural vehicle as a means of defining the scope of substantive rights or remedies,
federal courts must recognize and respect that choice.”210
The question becomes whether state pleading rules that permit actual malice to be alleged generally help to define the scope of the state-created cause of
action for defamation. It may well be that states tolerate general pleading of the
defendant’s state of mind because, as we have seen, it is so difficult for those
plaintiffs to gain access to the relevant facts prior to discovery. In states where
general pleading of actual malice is still permitted, a federal court’s application
of the plausibility pleading standard to allegations of actual malice will have a
substantive effect: the conditional privilege accorded to defendants in publicfigure libel cases will be converted into a virtual immunity from suit. Under
Justice Stevens’s analysis, then, the apparently procedural rule that actual malice can be pleaded generally may define the scope of the state-created right,
i.e., opening the courthouse doors to public-figure plaintiffs who have evidence

204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1452.
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1448.
Id. at 1449.
Id. at 1450.
Id.
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of the other elements of libel but need discovery to prove the defendant’s state
of mind.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that a federal rule of civil procedure violates the REA.211 However, in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp.,212 the Court avoided a collision between Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) and the Erie doctrine by refusing to read the phrase “operates
as an adjudication on the merits” to mean “having claim preclusive effect.”213
The Court recognized that a federal court’s application of Rule 41(b) to extinguish a claim while the law of the forum state would not do so “would arguably
violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules
shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”214
If a federal court applies the Twiqbal standard to extinguish a defamation
claim, while the law of the forum state would not do so, the disparity in outcomes would seem to abridge a substantive right.215 When a procedural rule
like Rule 8(a) is interpreted in such a restrictive way as to deprive plaintiffs of
any realistic opportunity to proceed with a state-created claim, that rule extinguishes the claim just as surely as Rule 41(b) would have done in Semtek if interpreted to lead to claim preclusion. As Adam Steinman puts it, “A claim that
cannot survive the pleading phase is effectively no claim at all.”216 Thus, the
application of the Twiqbal pleading standard to allegations of actual malice in
public-figure libel cases violates the Erie doctrine.217
211

Id. at 1473.
Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
213
Id. at 1026.
214
Id. at 1025.
215
The plaintiff in Biro took this position in its Petition for Certiorari. The complaint would
have been sufficient if filed in state court, and the case would have proceeded to discovery.
Application of the federal pleading standard led to dismissal of the complaint, resulting in a
“substantial variation in outcomes” due to application of federal law. Because of this substantial variation in outcomes, Rule 9(b) as interpreted by the Second Circuit, “abridge[d]”
the plaintiff’s substantive rights under New York law in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.
Under settled Erie doctrine, therefore, Biro argued, the court was required to apply New
York’s pleading standard instead of the federal standard. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 121, at 26–29.
216
Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333,
389 (2016).
217
Moreover, this drastic disparity in pleading standards enhances the probability of forum
shopping, as defendants facing suit by public-figure plaintiffs in states that have not adopted
Twiqbal will seek to remove to federal court to take advantage of the Twiqbal pleading
standard. For example, two of the five cases examined herein were originally filed in state
court and were then removed to federal court. See Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d
686 (11th Cir. 2016); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369
(4th Cir. 2012). But see Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly and Iqbal Affecting
Where Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV.
827, 830 (2013) (finding “no systematic increase in the rate of removal from state to federal
courts after Twombly and Iqbal, and the effect was not more pronounced in notice-pleading
states compared to fact-pleading states”). But see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. V. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (“[D]ivergence from state law, with the attendant
212
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IV.   PROPOSED REMEDIES
The line of Circuit Court of Appeals cases dismissing public-figure libel
actions demonstrates the deleterious consequences of applying the Twiqbal
pleading standard to allegations of state of mind under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b). Instead of following the Rule’s prescription that states of mind
can be pleaded generally, the Court required states of mind to be pleaded plausibly—that is, to be supported by factual allegations from which an inference of
the requisite state of mind can be drawn.218 When applied to allegations of actual malice in public-figure defamation cases, this requirement has resulted in
uniform holdings by five Circuit Courts of Appeals that the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations are insufficient.219 The resulting creation of a virtual immunity for
defendants in public-figure libel cases distorts the intention of the drafters,
transforms the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion,
and violates the Erie doctrine. These consequences should be remedied.
At the outset, however, some might argue that no remedy is warranted because it should be difficult for public figures to sue for libel.220 As the Eleventh
Circuit opined, eliminating general pleading of actual malice furthers the aim
articulated in New York Times of ensuring that media reporting is not chilled by
the threat of frivolous litigation.221 Moreover, in the current environment of
largely unregulated social media discourse, epithet-laden political speech, and
fake news, it can be argued that defamation is an outmoded concept, at least as
applied to public figures. But if a state wants to eliminate its cause of action for
defamation by public figures, it should do so as a matter of substance. The
cause of action should not be ended by implication as a matter of pleading in
federal court.
Assuming the effects of Twiqbal in public-figure libel cases should be
remedied, the most thoroughgoing remedy would be for the Court to abandon
the plausibility pleading standard altogether.222 Unfortunately, however, more
consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result
of a uniform system of federal procedure.”).
218
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009).
219
See supra Part II.B.
220
See, e.g., Clay Calvert et al., supra note 2, at 83.
221
See Michel, 816 F.3d at 695.
222
President Donald J. Trump has advocated “open[ing] up” libel laws. Hadas Gold, Donald
Trump: We’re Going to ‘Open Up’ Libel Laws, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2016, 2:31 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866
[https://perma.cc/CNV7-YSUF]. Although the precise nature of his proposal is unclear, he
appears to be advocating that the Court abandon the actual malice standard for public-figure
libel actions. See Sydney Ember, Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump?, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/business/media/can-libel-laws-bechanged-under-trump.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/AV52-63RZ]. Most scholars would agree
that the Court is even more unlikely to abandon the New York Times standard than it is to
abandon the Twiqbal standard. The Third Circuit has refused to apply the Twiqbal standard
to Rule 9(c). In Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 2014), the court
declared that “[n]either Iqbal nor Twombly purport to alter Rule 9 . . . . [W]e therefore con-
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than six years after Iqbal and several years after the failure of Congressional
efforts to repeal the Twiqbal standard, it appears that plausibility is here to stay.
The second-best solution would be for the Court to reverse its application of the
plausibility standard to allegations of states of mind. This solution might be
possible if the Court recognizes the unintended consequences of requiring plausibility in allegations of actual malice. When the Court is finally faced with a
public-figure defamation case dismissed on Twiqbal grounds, it will have the
opportunity to do so.223
In the meantime, the Circuit Courts of Appeals should avoid the fatal consequences of applying the plausibility standard to allegations of actual malice.
They can recognize that facts alleged to support knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity are not substitutes for proof. Instead, the courts
can treat these fact allegations as door-openers to discovery. If a plaintiff alleges facts that give rise to an inference of objective unreasonableness, the court
should not rule as a matter of law that these allegations are insufficient, even
though they would be insufficient if presented as the only proof of actual malice at trial. The court should recognize that these types of facts are the only type
readily available to plaintiffs without discovery and should allow these allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”224
Only by permitting public-figure plaintiffs access to discovery225 can the intention of the drafters be effectuated and a violation of the Erie doctrine be avoided.
CONCLUSION
The line of cases discussed in this Article—Schatz, Mayfield, Pippen, Biro,
and Michel—is the canary in the coal mine of plausibility pleading. If publicfigure defamation actions cannot survive in the Twiqbal environment, this
serves as a warning for every other type of case. That is, this line of cases
demonstrates just how bad the Twiqbal pleading standard is by showing that
plausibility pleading raises an insurmountable barrier to one class of plaintiffs.
Now that general allegations of actual malice are labelled conclusory, a plaintiff must have insider access to a defendant’s state of mind to satisfy the New
clude that the pleading of conditions precedent falls outside the strictures of Iqbal and
Twombly.”
223
There is an argument that the Circuit Courts of Appeals have been misapplying the
Twiqbal standard to allegations of actual malice. Cf. Steinman, supra note 216, at 364 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal “should not be read to impose a more restrictive pleading standard” than before and that “lower federal courts are wrong to take a more restrictive approach
to pleading”). If so, the Court can remedy the Circuits’ approach when it takes up a publicfigure libel case.
224
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
225
At least one scholar has suggested that courts grant plaintiffs limited access to discovery
when they are faced with a Twiqbal motion to dismiss; Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading
and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010).
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York Times standard at the pleading stage. Unless the defendant has commissioned a neutral third-party review of its own reporting and editorial processes,
as in Eramo, a public figure is unable to plead enough facts to show that the defendant believed the publication was false or acted with reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity.
Commenting on Schatz, Mayfield, and Pippen, one defense lawyer opined:
[C]ritics of the requirement that public figure defamation plaintiffs plead facts
plausibly supporting “actual malice” fault really are critics of Iqbal and
Twombly. If you accept the premise that every litigant has an obligation to allege
facts sufficient to render a claim “plausible on its face” in order to survive a motion to dismiss and thereby “unlock the doors of discovery” and impose substantial burdens on a defendant there is no reason to treat speech claims any differently from other claims.226

There are good reasons not to like Twiqbal generally. But there are even
better reasons to dislike the application of the plausibility standard to allegations of actual malice by public-figure libel plaintiffs. Like other classes of
plaintiffs, and perhaps more than most types of plaintiffs, the public-figure defamation plaintiff must unlock the doors of discovery to get the facts supporting
the defendant’s state of mind. Even the Court whose solicitude for the press led
it to create the actual malice standard did so against a backdrop of general
pleading of actual malice, and did so without undue concern for subjecting the
defendants to the costs of discovery. As applied by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, Twiqbal distorts the meaning of Rule 9(b), creates a catch-22 for publicfigure libel plaintiffs, and results in a violation of the Erie doctrine in states that
have not adopted plausibility pleading. Supreme Court review of a publicfigure libel case dismissed on Twiqbal grounds will indicate how committed
the Court is to plausibility pleading.

226

Clay Calvert et al., supra note 2, at 85 (quoting Chad Bowman, partner, Levine Sullivan
Koch & Schulz LLP, email from Bowman to authors (Sept. 23, 2013)).
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